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THREE NEW CAUSES OF ACTION?
A STUDY OF THE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
RAYMOND C. LEWIS, JR.*

Does a cause of action exist in favor of a child for negligent injury
to his parent not resulting in death? If not, should such a cause of
action be created?' Most practicing attorneys would probably answer
both questions "off the cuff" with a simple "no". A more emphatic and
forceful "no" would undoubtedly be heard from the insurance companies
and common carriers. It is the opinion of this writer that the cause of
action does not exist and should not be created; but it is also his opinion
that several wedges have been driven into the common law from which
this cause of action can be argued by analogy. At least two direct
attempts have recently been made to establish it, and considering the
number of trial and appellate courts in the United States it is entirely
possible that some ably presented attempts will succeed in the future.
Whether the common law would then present an unwavering front to
the cry of "trend" is not altogether certain.
Since the creation of such a cause of action necessarily involves a
consideration of two other controversial causes of action, namely, the
right of the wife to sue for the negligent invasion of her interest in the

*Attorney, Columbia, Mo. A3B. 1951, LL.B. 1954, University of Missouri.

1. This question was the subject of the 1953-54 Case Club competition at the
University of Missouri and was argued on Law Day before a Special Court composed
of Paul Van Osdol, Commissioner of the Supreme Court of Missouri, A. P. Stone,
Judge of the Springfield Court of Appeals, and Ivan Lee Holt, Jr., Judge, 8th Judicial
Circuit. The court, by a 2 to 1 vote, decided against the establishment of the cause
of action. This writer was at that time a student at the University of Missouri and
a participant in the competition. Credit for the research necessary for this article
must naturally be divided among the other three participants, Fred E. Schoenlaub,
now practicing in St. Joseph, Missouri, and Dgvid L. Hilton and Robert Redmond,
law students at the University who will graduate in June, 1955.
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family relationship, and the right of the child to sue for the intentional
invasion of his interest in the family relationship, it is the purpose of
this article to consider these three causes of action, with particular
emphasis upon the child's action for negligent invasion of his interest.
There have been two decisions directly denying a cause of action
to a child for negligent injury to his parent, but they were not exhaustive,
nor were they final in tone. In Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital,2 a case
decided by the District Court of the District of Columbia in 1952, the
plaintiff, a minor child suing by her stepfather, sought to recover damages
resulting from the deprivation of the comfort, aid, kindness and assistance
of her mother due to injuries sustained by the mother as the result of
the alleged negligence of the denfendant. Despite the fact that this
attempt was made in one of the three jurisdictions that have extended the
right to sue for negligent invasion of consortium to the wife,8 the court
denied that such a right of action existed in the child, and called attention
to the fact that no jurisdiction had ever sanctioned such a cause of action.
The language of the one page opinion, however, could probably be used
as effectively for the cause of action as against it, for the court stated: 4
"This Court confesses that it has been difficult for it on
the basis of natural justice to reach the conclusion that this type
of an action will not lie. When a child loses the love and companionship of a parent, it is deprived of something that is indeed
valuable and precious. Courts should ever be alert to widen
the circle of justice to conform to the changing needs and conditions of society. At the same time a lower court should be
cautious in laying down a completely new rule in the light of
prior holdings of our Court of Appeals indicating hesitancy to
extend the right of recovery... to a child."
During the past year the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected a
similar attempt to establish the cause of action in Jeune v. Del E. Webb
Const. Co.5 In this case both the wife and the minor child of the injured
person attempted to recover on separate causes of action. The child
asked recovery for loss of support, education and parental comfort. The
opinion centered its discussion primarily on the denial of the wife's
2. 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952). This case is discussed in 6 OMA. L. Rv.
500 (1953) and 6 VAm. L. REv. 926 (1953).
3. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (App. D.C. 1950).
4. 108 F. Supp. 739 at 741.
5. 269 P.2d 723 (Ariz. 1954).
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right of action, but the holding also clearly rejected the child's action.
The court admitted that there has been a split of opinion as to whether
a child has an action for intentional interference with his interest in the
domestic relation since the case of Daily v. Parker,6 but indicated that
in any event such an action clearly could not form the basis of the action
before the court. The court refused to follow by analogy a recent decision
of that state7 allowing the wife a cause of action against a defendant for
knowingly furnishing liquor to her husband, a habitual drunkard, and
also refused to follow the District of Columbia case of Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co. 8 allowing the wife a cause of action for loss of consortium.
In addition to the two direct attempts referred to above, the Minnesota case of Eschenbach v. Benjamin9 can be used as authority against
the existence of this cause of action. In that case the wife and three minor
children of Eschenbach sued the defendant for negligently inflicting
permanent injuries upon Eschenbach. The cause of action was denied by
a unanimous Supreme Court of Minnesota, but it is not clear from the
opinion what theory was relied upon by the children for their attempted
recovery. The attitude of the court was clear enough, however, for it
stated: 10
"...

the general rule is that at common law neither wife

nor children have a cause of action for an injury inflicted upon
the husband and father, that right being strictly limited to the
injured party ... "
And further on the same page:
"If this rule were to be extended as plaintiffs would have
us do, then, .... there would, in many accident cases, be litigation almost without end and all based upon a single tort and only
one individual physically involved in the accident itself."
While research has revealed no other attempts to establish this cause
of action, the courts of Missouri, Massachusetts and Michigan have employed strong dicta indicating their accord with the above cases. In
the Missouri case of Stout v. K. C. Terminal Railway," the court, in deny-

6. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
7. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147, 130 A.L.R. 341 (1940).
8.

183 F.2d 8U (App. D.C. 1950).

9. 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935).
10. 263 N.W. 154, at 155.
11. 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913).
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ing the injured person's wife a cause of action against the negligent
defendant for loss of consortium, stated: 12
"there may be a loss (in common parlance) of comfort and
society to the wife and so there may be to the children, yet these
are not those direct or natural losses the law has recognized.
They are remote consequences." (emphasis added)
Similar dicta may be found in the Massachusetts case of Feneff v.
N.Y. Central and H. R.R., 13 and in the Michigan case of Blair v. Seitner
Dry Goods Company.14 There is, moreover, the negative evidence that
such a cause of action is not even mentioned, much less favored, by
the great mass of text and encyclopedia writers. What then could be
the basis for such a cause of action?
If this right of action in a child is to be recognized, it must be my
way of analogy, and probably by one or more of the following:
1. There have been cases extending to the wife a right of action for
loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of her husband, 1 this
action being similar to the traditional common law action on the part
of the husband.
2. There have been cases extending to the child a right of action for
alienation of his parent's affections."0
3. There is some analogy between the cause of action under discussion and the common law cause of action existing in a parent for the loss
of a child's services.
4. There is some analogy between this cause of action and the
cause of action sometimes allowed a wife against a person knowingly
supplying her husband with drugs or intoxicating liquor.
5. There is the analogy of the wrongful death statutes and of other
statutes vesting particular rights of action in minor children.

12. 157 S.W. 1019, at 1021.
13. 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
14. 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915).
15. Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, 183 F.2d 811 (App. D.C. 1950); Brown v.
Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Cooney v.
Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953).
16. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Luhnan, 330 Ill.
App. 598 (1947); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Miller v.
Monsen, 228 Minn. 400 (1949).
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A combination of the first two analogies would seem the most forceful presentation that could be made, i.e. a combination of the right of
action in the wife for negligent invasion of consortium with the right of
action in a child for intentional invasion of his interest in the family
relationship, thereby giving the child an action for negligent invasion.
The chief difficulty in this approach is that the analogies are themselves
but minority views already refuted in many jurisdictions.
I.

WiFE's ACTION

FOR Loss

or CoNsoRTIU

In Hitaffer v. Argonne Company,'7 the Federal Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia made a thorough and extensive analysis of
the question and decided that the wife should have a cause of action for
the negligent invasion of her right of consortium. The court viewed the
wife's loss as the end of an unbroken chain of cause and effect and
therefore not too remote to be a recoverable item of damages, pointing
out that the husband has a similar cause of action to which "remoteness"
of injury has never been a defense. The court also answered the claim
that damages could not properly be assessed by pointing out that damages
were satisfactorily assessed in the corresponding action on the part of
the husband and also in the husband's action for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation where the entire recovery is for intangible
elements and no element of compensation for services is involved.
Moreover, the court felt, and probably accurately, that loss of
services is an "outworn fiction". The real basis for the decision was that
the underlying ground of the common law discrimination against the wife
(i.e. her incapacity to maintain a separate action for ° tort) was swept
away by the Married Womens Act and there was therefore no longer a
basis for the distinction. The decision is convincing to read, but has
a major weakness in that it seems to use the existence of the husband's
right of action as its mainstay rather than a consideration of the real
merits of the cause of action. This seems true despite the statement by
the court that it did not base its opinion alone upon the inequality between husband and wife. As discussed later in this article, there have
been other and perhaps more satisfactory solutions to the inequality of
the common law.

17. 183 F.2d 811 (App. D.C. 1950).
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In McDade v. West,1 8 the Georgia court was evenly divided on allowing recovery, but four years later the same court adopted the Hitaffer
decision in its entirety in the case of Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
20
9
Coaches, Inc.1 stating:
"It is as much the duty of this court to restore a right which
has been erroneously withheld by judicial opinion as it is to
recognize the propriety in the first instance . . . we do indeed

have a 'charge to keep' but that charge is not to perpetuate error
or to allow our reasoning or conscience to decay or to turn deaf
to new life and new light."
One further case allowing such recovery to the wife is Cooney v.
Moomaw,2' decided in the federal district court for Nebraska.
Although the first of these decisions, the Hitaffer case, was not
handed down until 1950, it still requires some stretch of the imagination
to decide that the three cases constitute a substantial trend. The overwhelming weight of authority still denies to the wife the right of recovery
for loss of consortium when the husband is negligently injured by the
defendant. The question of the wife's right of action has arisen and been
denied in at least twenty-four jurisdictions including Missouri. One
such case from each of these jurisdictions is cited below.2 2 Moreover, a
substantial number of cases can be cited which denied the wife's right

18. 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949).
19. 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 SE.2d 24 (1953).
20. 77 S.E.2d 24, at 32.
21. 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953).
22. Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918); Lurie v. Mammone,
200 Misc. 320, 107 N.Y.2d 182 (1951); Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258,
72 P.2d 1101 (1937); Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 269 P.2d 723 (Ariz. 1954);

Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911) (denied to husband, indicat-

ing action not available to either spouse); Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127
All. 49 (1924); Ripley v. Ewel, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Petelski v. Snyder, 179 1II.
App. 24 (1913); Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Cravens
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Feneff v. New York Cent.
& H. R.R. 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 At.
538 (1918); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915)
(denied to husband, indicating neither spouse could recover); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Nash v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 149 Miss. 823,
116 So. 100 (1928); Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 SME. 307 (1925);
Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921); Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93
Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric Co-operative,
Inc., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949); Sheard v. Oregon Electric Ry., 137 Ore. 341,
2 P.2d 916 (1913); Dupe v. Hunsberger, 58 PD. & C. 483, 62 Montg. Co. L.R. 315 (Pa.
1946); Martin v. United Electric R.R., 71 RI. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945) (denied to
husband); Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 261 P.2d 118 (Wdsh. 1953).
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of action after the decision in Hitaffer v. Argonne, and at least eight
decisions can be cited in which the Hitaffer case was expressly consider23
ed and rejected.
Finally, at least three jurisdictions have allowed the wife an action
for loss of consortium, or at least indicated that they would do so, only to
reverse themselves and rejoin the majority. In Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. 24 North Carolina allowed the wife this right; but four

years later the supreme court of that state unanimously denied such right
of action in the wife in Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co. 2 5 stating that
'206
".... Any intimation to the contrary in Hipp v. DuPont is disapproved.
Griffen v. Cincinnati Realty Co.2 7 allowed the wife an action for loss of
consortium in Ohio, but two years later Ohio law was established to the
contrary in Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. 28 And Passalacquav. Draper29

allowed the action to the wives of New York, only to be reversed on
appeal. 30 In addition to the American cases, the English courts have
denied the wife's action for loss of consortium on facts almost identical to
the facts in the Hitaffer case in Best v. Samuel Fox, Ltd.3 1
The reason advanced by the courts in denying the right of action to
the wife have been many and varied. The most common are remoteness
of the wife's injury, fear of double recovery, technical comparisons with
the husband's right, upsetting of settlements, inability to measure damages, and lack of power to create new causes of action.
1. Remoteness of injury. Many courts have considered the injury
of the wife too remote and indirect to allow recovery.3 2 While this view is

23. Ripley v. Ewell, supra note 22; Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., supra note 22; Jeune
v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., supra note 5; Franzen v. Zimmerman, 256 P.2d 897 (Colo.
1953); LaEace v. Cincinnati, New Port & Covington Ry., 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952);
Larocca v. American Chain and Cable Co., 23 N.J. Super 195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952);
Cook v. Snyder, 119 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Nelson v. AM. Lockett & Co., Ltd.,
206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952).
24. 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
25. 189 N.C. 120, 126 SM. 307 (1925).
26. 126 SE. 307 at 312.
27. 27 Ohio Dec. 585 (1913).
28. 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
29. 199 Misc. 827, 104 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
30. Passalacqua v. Drapper, 279 App. Div. 660, 107 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't. 1951).
31. 2 K. B. 639 (1951).
32. Stout v. K.C. Terminal R.R., supra note 11; Feneff v. New York, Cent. & H.
R.R., supra note 13; Giggy v. Gallagher Transp. Co., supra note 22; Hinnant v. Tidewater, supra note 25; Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative Inc., supra
note 22; Best v. Samuel Fox, Ltd, supra note 31.
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probably in keeping with traditional concepts of proximate cause, it is
open to the objection that the husband is allowed an action for loss of
consortium under the same circumstances. Certainly the wife's loss from
the husband's injury is no more remote than the husband's loss from the
wife's injury. However, the husband's right has been carried over from
very early common law and has existed as a separate cause of action
not governed by the customary negligence analysis. Whatever validity
the argument of remoteness has, however, it is strengthened in its application to a consideration of creating a like right in the child. If the right
should be given to the child, why not also the step-child or grandchild or
dependent parent or someone yet further removed.
It is interesting to note that while three states have removed the
inconsistency between the husband and wife by allowing the wife a
cause of action, as discussed above, at least five states have solved the
problem by taking away the husband's cause of action following passage
33
of the Married Women's Acts.
2. Fear of double recovery. A second argument against the wife's
right of action is that the husband's recovery, in legal contemplation,
makes him whole, and the wife therefore has no cause of action.3 4 This
fear of double recovery becomes fear of multiple recovery if the right
is extended to children. A good summary of this viewpoint is contained in an article by Professor Roscoe Pound in which he stated: 3
"Where these interests are infringed by physical injury to the
husband or by an abduction of the husband, a difficulty arises in
that the husband has an action in which he may recover for
diminution of his earning power, loss of earnings, and impairments of his ability to support those dependent upon him. The
same problem arises in case of like interests of children. The reason for not securing the interest of the wife or child in these cases
seems to be that our modes of trial are such and our mode of
assessment of damages by the verdict of a jury is necessarily so

33. Marri v. Stamford Street Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911); Bolger v.
Boston Elevated R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods
Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Helmstetter v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C.

821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Martin v. United Electric R.R., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
34. Bernhardt v. Perry; Boden v. Del Mar Garage, Inc.; Giggy v. Gallagher
Transp. Co.; Marri v. Stamford St. Ry.; Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R.R.; Tobiassen v. Polley, supra note 22.
35. Pound, Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 McH. L. REV. 177 (193) (1916).
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crude, that if husband and wife were each allowed to sue, instead
of each recovering an exact reparation, each would be pretty
sure to recover what would repair the injury to both. Moreover, the injury to wife or child is very hard to measure in
money. Hence, on a practical balancing of interests the wife is
usually denied an action."
Pound does not seem too concerned about the lack of symmetry
arising from the husband having an action under like circumstance, for
he states: 36
"Reviewing the whole subject of individual interests in the
domestic relations, it will be seen that on the surface the interests
of the parent and of the husband are more completely secured
than those of the wife and of the child. But under modern legislation and in view of the course of modern decisions, the difference is often more superficial than substantial."
3. The wife is owed no services. A third argument is that the
husband's right of action is based primarily upon his right to his wife's
services, and that since the husband owes the wife no services he has
lost nothing for which she can recover. This objection, though technically arguable, is probably the weakest of those discussed and is certainly
unrealistic. It does find some support, however, including support from
Missouri and the Restatement."
4. The upsetting of settlements. The Supreme Court of Florida, en
banc, in Ripley v. Ewell,38 gave as one of its reasons for rejecting the
Hitaffer doctrine the dislike of upsetting compromise settlements on
39
which the statute of limitations had not run. The court frankly stated:
"In the second place we would be blinding ourselves to known
conditions if we did not appreciate the fact that almost daily
accidents occur which come within the scope of the questions
here presented and that in most cases the parties responsible
make settlements with those injured.
"If we were to adopt the rule asserted by appellant, all such

36. Id., p. 196.
37. Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry.; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co.; RESTATELiNT

OF TORTS § 965 (1938), and comment (a) thereto.

38. 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
39. 61 So.2d 420 at 424.
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cases, when the husband was the injured party, and within
the statute of limitations, would be reopened and a new claim
presented by the wife, and new liabilities imposed upon persons
who have already paid once for the result of their negligent acts.
While we should not hesitate to declare the law as we find it,
even though the unwary who have been ill advised in their action
may suffer, we should not by judicial fiat make changes in established law that will injuriously affect many persons who could
not possibly foresee or anticipate such action on our part."
Needless to say, the number of such settlements that would be upset
would be far greater if the action were extended to the child.
5. Unintentionally caused harm to the relationship cannot properly
be compensated. Another argument is that despite the vital role of conjugal relations in American family life, the law should not attempt to
award damages for unintentionally caused harm to this delicate relationship.40 The inability of a jury to properly assess damages for such intangible loss and the inadequacy of monetary damages when recovered are
factors here.
6. The courts are powerless to create new causes of action. The
courts often refuse to recognize such a novel claim upon lack of precedent
41
and lack of power to create a new cause of action without precedent.
This argument is unsound, for our courts have on many occasions entered
the field of judicial empiricism to create new causes of action. Many
states, for example, have recently allowed by judicial decision a cause of
action for injury to an unborn child. Perhaps a better view is that while
novelty of cause of action is not a complete bar, it does cast an extremely
heavy burden upon the plaintiff to justify his cause. As stated by a
Canadian writer.42 commenting on Best v. Samuel Fox, Ltd:
"....

On the contrary, everything points to the presumptions

being the other way, and that though the court will not necessarily strike out a claim in limine because of its novelty, it will
regard the onus as being on the plaintiff to show some close
analogy with an existing head of liability before admitting the
claim into the arcana of acknowledged categories of tortious responsibility."

40. Marri v. Stamford Ry., supra note 22; 14 Mcs. L. REv. 177, supra note 35.
41. Ripley v. Ewell; Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., supra note 23.
42. Lloyd, comment, 29 CAx. L. REv. 210, 215 (1951).
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7. The disparity between negligent and intentionalinvasion. Finally,
in the many states which have already denied the child an action for
intentional invasion of the family relationship, 43 the creation of this
cause of action would result in affording the plaintiff a higher degree
of protection from negligent injury than from intentional injury. 44
These are the reasons advanced for denying the wife an action for
loss of consortium. Some may not be sound. Their cumulative effect,
however, would seem to indicate that the reluctance to recognize this
action is based upon more than ultra-conservative or reactionary judges,
particularly in view of the fact that many of these decisions are recent
cases decided by the best courts in America. These arguments, whatever
they are worth, are more forceful when applied to a consideration of
creating a like right in the child.
II.

CHILD'S ACTION FOR

ALIENATION

OF AFFECTIONS

There is another close analogy by which the child might be given
an action for negligent injury to his parent. Again, however, as with the
wife's action for loss of consortium, the analogy is a minority view if it
can be considered even that.
In the 1945 federal case of Daily v. Parker,45 the court established a
precedent and allowed a child a cause against one who had enticed away
one of his parents, stating: 46
"Our conclusion, without going further into the matter, is
that a child today has a right enforceable in a court of law,
against one who has invaded and taken from said child the support and maintenance of its father, as well as damages for the
destruction of other rights which arise out of the family relationship and which have been destroyed or defeated by a wrong
doing third party. Likewise, we are persuaded that because such
rights have not heretofore been recognized, is not a conclusive
reason for denying them."
For the establishment of this cause of action the court relied in
part upon an Illinois Constitutional provision guaranteeing a remedy in

43. The alienation of affections and criminal conversation cases, discussed infra.
44. See Note, 1951 U. OE' Iz. L. FoRuM 322 at 325.

45. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
46. 152 F.2d 174, at 177.
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the law for all injuries.4 7 It should be noted in this regard, however,
that similar provisions appear in nearly all state constitutions, including
that of Missouri, 48 but such provisions are generally not construed as
authorizing new causes of action, but merely as protecting established
49
legal rights.
Daily v. Parker was immediately hailed as a "landmark" case and
was commented upon in over a hundred notes and comments in the
legal periodicals, more often than not in a favorable manner. A sample
of such favorable comment is found in the Missouri Law Review:50
"It is submitted that the Parker case is one of those rare and
admirable instances in judicial history, in which a court will
depart from outmoded precedent and render a decision in harmony with contemporary principles of social organization."
Several decisions were shortly handed down which adopted the
doctrine of Daily v. Parker: the Illinois case of Johnson v. Luhman,5'
the Minnesota case of Miller v. Monsen, 2 and the federal case of Russiek
v. Hicks,53 decided in Michigan. However, since Daily v. Parker was
decided in Illinois, the "trend" amounted to only three jurisdictions and
stopped there. The cause of action was attempted and denied in at least
4
ten jurisdictions after the decision in Daily v. Parker.5

47.

ILL. CONST. Art.

11, §

19: "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in

the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property,
or reputation."
48. MO. CONST. Art. I, § 14: "That the courts of justice shall be open to every
person and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character,

and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
49. Waltman v. Waltman, 153 Minn 217, 189 N.W. 1022 (1922); Conley v. Conley,

92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 709 (c), page 1496.
50. Cholkofsky, Right of Children to Sue for Interference with the Family Relation and Support, 15 Mo. L. REV. 58 at page 65 (1950).
511. 330 Ill.
App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
52. 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
53. 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
54. Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (App. D.C. 1950); Nelson v. Richwager, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d
768 (1947); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948) (statute abolishing alienation suits); Kleinow v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super 165, 88 A.2d 31 (1952)
(statute barring alienation suits held to bar wife's action; no action exists in child);
Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (statute barring alienation
actions, but court indicating that child had no action before the statute); Henson v.
Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98
N.E.2d 74 (1951); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Scholberg
v. Itneyere, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953).
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The reasons advanced by the courts in denying the child an action
for alienation of his parent's affections center around the inability to
Pteate new causes of action, fear of excessive litigation, and the technical
ojection that the child has no right to the consortium of parents.
1. The courts are powerless to create new causes of action. This
objection has been raised to some extent by the courts in denying the wife
an action for loss of consortium. However, it has been relied on much
more heavily in denying the child a cause of action for alienation of his
parent's affections, as the following excerpts clearly demonstrate:
. .. in the absence of legislation, expressly authorizing it, an

action of this sort cannot be maintained in the District of Columbia."5)
"We still believe that the creation of new rights is a question for
the consideration and determination of the
legislature, a func'56
tion which the courts should not usurp.
"Much has been said and written concerning 'judicial empiricism'. . . . However, the members of the court are of the opinion

that the right to create new legal rights and remedies is . . .
vested in the legislative bodies and not in the courts, . . .,,57
".... neither public policy nor any other concept can here justify

8
a creation of personal rights by so called 'judicial process'."
"The 'excelsior cry for a better system', in order to keep step
with the new conditions and spirit of a more progressive age,
must be made to the legislature rather than to the courts, whose
only province is to enforce the law as they find it."5 9

As previously mentioned, this argument appears unsound when one
considers the many causes of action that have been created by means of
judicial empiricism. It does, however, provide an "easy way out" for the
courts which regard the creation of the new action as unwise upon a
practical balancing of the many and intangible interests involved.
2. The fear of excessive litigation. Another argument advanced is
that of fear of excessive litigation. As stated by a New York court in
Morrow v. Yannantuono:60
55. Elder v. MacAlphine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385, at page 385 (App. D.C. 1950).
56. Scholberg v. Itneyere, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1953).
57. Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951).
58. Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 at 987 (1948).
59. Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 at 1015-1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), quoting
from Gowin v. Gowin, 264 S.W. 529 at page 538.
60. 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 at 913-914 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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"If this plaintiff has a cause of action, then his brothers and
sisters, if any, also have a cause of action.... I am convinced
that to uphold this complaint would open our courts to a flood of
litigation that would indundate them. It would mean that every
one whose cheek is tinged by the blush of shame would rush into
court.... The husband has a cause of action. The ages and number of his children are elements to be considered in his action."
This argument is often criticized upon the ground that if a right exists
it should be protected, and it is the duty of the state to provide adequate
machinery to protect its citizens in enforcing such rights. It is the
opinion of this writer, however, that such criticism presupposes the
existence of the right, and that when a court is asked to exercise its
quasi-legislative powers and invent a new cause of action, it is justified in
weighing all the factors of practicability and policy in the process. Certainly the necessity of "drawing a line somewhere" has resulted in some
very basic concepts of our law-the concept of proximate cause being
probably the most notable example. Needless to say, the force of this
argument is magnified many times in a consideration of extending the
child's right to include negligence.
3. The technical objection that the child has no right to his parents'
consortium. Another objection to the child's right of action is that, for all
practical purposes, the action is one for loss of consortium and a child
has no legal right to the consortium of his parents. 61 This argument would
apply equally to the creation of the child's right for negligent invasion of
his family interest, but it is a very weak objection in that it is based upon
technical and historical considerations without any evaluation of the
merits of the action.
A note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review0 2 presents a
sound summary of four practical objections to the establishment of such
a right: first, multiplicity, of suits; second, possibility of extortionary
litigation, since the action, always susceptible to fraud, becomes more so
by virtue of its numerical increase and the relative tenuousness of the
child's relationship; third, inability to define the point at which the
child's right would cease, inasmuch as the status itself hypothesizes muta-

61. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156,56 A.2d 768 (1947); Morrow v. Yannantuono,
152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass.
485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950).
62. 83 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 276 (1934).
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bility (i.e. a spouse is always a spouse, but a child becomes an adult);
and fourth, inability of a jury to cope with the question of damages-both
because of the type of injury and because of the possible overlapping
with the parent's recovery. All of these arguments, except the second,
would, of course, apply to the creation of a child's right for negligent
invasion of his interest in the family realtionship.
HI. OTHER ANALoGIES
Aside from the two major analogies discussed above, there are
other analogies from which a child's right of action for loss of consortium
could be argued. A thorough study of these analogies is outside the scope
of this article, but they should at least be mentioned in passing.
1. Analogy of the parent's action for loss of child's services. There
is a definite analogy between the parent's action for loss of his child's
services and the child's action under consideration. This analogy becomes more forceful as the courts increasingly tend to ignore the necessity for "loss of services" and allow recovery for the intangible elements
of the parent's loss. 0 3 Many jurisdictions, however, still require a showing of actual pecuniary loss before allowing the parent to recover.64
While this analogy is a fairly strong one, it should be remembered that
the action for loss of child's services, like the husband's action for loss
of consortism, has been carried over from the early common law, and its
existence does not necessarily establish the propriety of creating like
rights in the child.
2. Analogy to the action for knowingly furnishing drugs or alcohol to
an addict. Many jurisdictions have developed, by statute or case law, a
cause of action, usually in the wife, against one who knowingly furnishes
drugs or liquor to the husband-addict. 65 Such an action, however, appears
too narrow in scope to justify the creation of the cause under discussion.
3. Analogy to the wrongful death and other statutory causes of

63. Stephens v. Weigel, 336 I11. App. 36, 82 N.E.2d 697 (1948); Hayward v. Yost,
72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal. App.2d 752, 199 P.2d 721

(1948).
64. Gilbert v. Stanton, 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.2d 155 (1946); Mobile & 0. RXR. v.
Watley, 69 Miss. 45, 13 So. 825 (1891); Quinn v. Pittsburg, 243 Pa. 521, 90 Atl. 353
(1914); Sorells v. Matthews, 129 Ga. 319, 58 SE. 819 (1907); Evans v. Farmer's
Elevator Co., 347 Mo. 326, 147 S.W.2d 593 (1941); Stone v. City of Pleasanton, 115
Kan. 476, 223 Pac. 303 (1924).
65. An example is Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147, 130 A.L.R. 341 (1940).
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action. Children have, in recent years, been vested with statutory causes
of action under wrongful death statutes, the Federal Employer's liability
Act, and other statutes. Moreover, recovery for intangible elements has
often been allowed under these statutory causes of action.00 It might be
argued, however, that the very existence of these actions argues against
the establishment of similar causes by the courts for the reason that if the
legislature has considered this area of the family relationship and specifially enacted legislation to protect a particular interest therein, the failure
of the legislature to cover other similar rights would seem, by implication,
to exclude such rights.

CoNCLUSION

It can be seen that the wife's action for loss of consortium and the
child's action for alienation of affections are allowed by only a small
minority of jurisdictions and are opposed by recent decisions of a vast
majority of the courts of this country. It can also be seen that the creation
of the child's right for negligent invasion of his interest in the family
relationship would necessarily involve acceptance of these two analogous
causes of action if the law is to be established in an orderly manner. The
creation of this trio of new causes of action would therefore result in a
number of cross-relationships within each family all of which would be
protected by the courts against both negligent and intentional invasion.
It is submitted that despite the seeming tendency of our law to encompass
and protect larger areas of interest, the practical considerations involved
are too great to merit the establishment of these causes of action at the
present time.

66. Mobile & 0. R.R. v. Williams, 226 Ala. 541, 147 So. 819 (1933) ("care, atten-tion, instruction, training, advice and guidance"); Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117
Cal. App. 492, 256 P.2d 603 (1953) ("care, attention, instruction, training, advice and
guidance"); Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line RB., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938)
("mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief and sorrow, loss of companionship, and deprivation of the experience, knowledge, judgment, care and protection");
Shulman v. Los Angeles Ry. Coi-p., 44 Cal. App2d 122, 111 P.2d 924 (1941) ("society,
comfort, care, protection and right to receive support"); Smith v. Mederacke, 302
Mo. 538, 259 S.W. 83 (1924) ("the home she furnished to them, the mental and moral
training and physical care she would, as a mother, bestow").
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